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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**TITLE: INDIRECT RISE OF POWER:
China's Economic and Military Growth and its Changing Relationship with the United
States**

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Executive Summary

Title: Indirect Rise of Power: China's Economic and military Growth and its Changing Relationship with the United States

Author: Major T. T. Reddinger, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Is the interdependent financial relationships between China and the United States enough to stop China from dominating Asia and Pacific region?

Discussion: Dating back to the Ming Dynasty, China believed it was the center of the world. Their culture labeled foreigners as barbarians and saw outsiders as a disruption to its self-contained system. China's closed-door policy lasted for several hundred centuries until European traders influenced this notion and ultimately led to the destruction of China's dynastic empire via the Opium Wars. Over the past 25 years, China's rise in economic power is unrivaled by any other nation. Similarly, China ranks as the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods in the world. The Chinese hold a variety of advantages over the U.S. in the export market and tightly control their currency value to avoid direct competition against the U.S. dollar. The importance of China's overt decision to govern its currency strongly enhances the many export advantages China shares over the U.S.

Regional and global diplomatic relationships between China and other nations are also becoming increasingly important to the U.S. As the Chinese economy has grown to become the second largest in the world, China now has acquired economic influence on nations around the world. As China has become more involved in the global economic community, its assertiveness has been more apparent. This growing influence raises concerns for the U.S. and other regional powers as to the future stability of China and has led to an increasing pattern of distrust between the two nations. Even with its highly valued economic relationships with the U.S., the unknowns over China's nuclear policy, secrecy of its government operations, and modernization of its military raise suspicion on behalf of the U.S. and PRC's regional neighbors about the motivations of the country.

Conclusion: The U.S. course of action following the unprecedented rise of China should be one of caution and closeness. Gradually, the U.S. must reduce its dependency through drawing back investments in China. Simultaneously the U.S. must maintain military relationships with China itself to serve as an important part in maintaining peace and cooperation in the region.

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Preface

Today, no matter where I turn or look in my professional or personal life -- someone I know has suffered economically. For starters my sister, a finance lender, absorbed a life-altering blow when she learned about the downsizing of her position across her industry. In the prime of her financial abilities (age wise) to earn -- she was forced to reinvent her earning potential. By the same token, the economic repercussions are changing the landscape of the Department of Defense (DoD). All branches must be judicious and factual in defending their policies and practices. Wholesale financial changes are now forcing military branches to prioritize all endeavors. For me, it is fascinating and frightening as China incrementally bolsters its capacity to challenge the hold of global supremacy of the United States how DoD will reorganize capabilities under a state of economic hardship.

Today's attention with fiscal restraints is a stark contrast from my early impressive years. As a college student, I witnessed the dot.com boom. Technology aided economic prosperity unlike anything the world had every seen since the invention of mass transit commerce methods. The amateur middle class workers became day traders. Money was made hand over fist in months and many Americans took advantage of the get rich quick avenues of the late 20th century. Albeit, the financial windfall of the dot.com venture abruptly collapsed and the cycle of expeditious gains crushed many, this brief lesson was only a prelude into a greater concern that eventually consumed the private sector and government when you explore the troubling effects of mass leaning to home owners. Compare that experience with my early years in the military and resources were plentiful. We were a nation at war. I saw the Marine Corps exchange dated end items from deployment to deployment. Validating or justifying a claim to refurbish

workspaces was simply routine. Likewise on sending personnel on temporary duty assignments – it simply got done without recourse pending any linkage supporting the war efforts.

My fascination with the economy and its direct influence on the military developed as I matured. As I started investing and building my family -- simple lessons of wants and needs started shaping my opinions regarding the military's approach in dealing with circumstances abroad. However, one particular event painfully illustrated to me how far as an institution we as a service have slipped away from accountability when resources are readily available. I was the Ministry of Interior Coordinator working for Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I). My billet was centered on developing police primacy and professionalizing the Iraq Police Forces in Al Anbar, Iraq. Weekly my interfaces included engagements with Iraqis and coalition higher headquarters.

Part of our approach in professionalizing the Iraq Force included infrastructure projects. We used deliberate measures to ensure the Iraqi police manpower numbers supported the population centers and also analyzed the geography and jurisdiction boundaries between the ministries to ensure inflation was minimized. According to my calculations, Al Anbar police were sufficiently outfitted with district and local stations. My predecessors at MNF-I had already dealt with this shortfall. I shared this information with my chain of command and its higher headquarters. Nevertheless, a two million dollar contract was awarded in support of an unnecessary project to cover a quarterly budget.

I realize this simple story is not related to China or the mechanics that destroy or grow the economy. The connections of this preface to my topic are some of the personal events that led me toward the importance of economic warfare. I truly believe the U.S. road to recovery from a market standpoint rests in our relationship with China. To say the U.S. has an awkward

relationship with China is an understatement. Certainly, many interests divide the two states, but none is more important to complementing strategic objects than a healthy economy.

I found researching a contemporary issue as broad as China both challenging and rewarding. Daily, new sources of information on my topic appeared over the diverse types of media platforms. This barrage of information available was a double edge sword, as it added a layer of complexity in pinpointing exactly where I wanted to concentrate my analysis. Often news stories on the subject of China provided superfluous information straying from the topic at hand. The subject material was overwhelming and tedious to filter. However, a majority of the stories addressing China's economy were supported by strong analysis by economists. Most news stories on China's international policies were editorial based. Open sourced studies from various U.S. political/military institutions served as my baseline method of collecting information on China's foreign and national strategies. My most rewarding experience in this endeavor was applying several of the lessons I learned from my Operational Art and Cultural Interagency Operations from Command and Staff College (CSC) into this paper. I can assure you, that my depth and breadth on the subject would have been significantly narrow without the support of the aforementioned blocks of instructions from CSC. Lastly, I have to give my wife, Mary K. Reddinger, significant credit. She pushed me throughout this process. Several times I felt this research endeavor was beyond my capabilities. Her positive attitude and unselfish nature was a source of inspiration and I am deeply indebted to her for her sacrifices. Mrs. Reddinger you are a dear and I love you. I thank you immensely.

OVERVIEW

At the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States stood alone as the single global superpower. Since that time, two events have incrementally eroded the nation's stability and drained the preponderance of her foreign policy and military attention: the Global War on Terror and the rapid ascension of China's global influence. While the Global War on Terror is the more immediate and tangible threat endangering Americans and has garnered the majority of media headlines, these irregular warfare conflicts have done little to neutralize or marginalize the global influence of the United States. Conversely, China has ascended as a powerful, yet unassuming rival, to the United States in the 21st century. The relationships between China and the United States are convoluted compared to those of the Cold War. The strict and clearly defined adversarial relationship during the Cold War (at least until the Nixon Administration) is in great contrast to the ambiguous relationship that the United States currently shares with China.

To quell growing fears of states in the Western Pacific region, China assures its global influence is peaceful. Despite their proclamations, political and military leaders of other nations in the area and the United States are uncertain of what lies ahead. What does China's growing military and economic power mean for the United States? What is the extent of China's increased capacity to shape global affairs? Will China's political aspirations challenge the United States, or are the Chinese genuine in their message to maintain peace?

The likelihood of the United States engaging in military action should China act offensively in the Asian-Pacific region can be assessed as low. This is due to the increasingly vital role that the Chinese economy plays in the global markets as well as in foreign affairs. In discussing the increasing strength of the economy, this paper will also address the growing political influence of China on the Asian-Pacific region and its economic partners. It will

attempt to unearth China's motivation to increase its military strength and capabilities and discuss whether this is influenced primarily by economic or political factors. Furthermore, it will discuss how China's military growth combined with its economic relationships with the United States has set the stage for China to dominate Asia and the Pacific region and limit the influence of the United States.

CHINA'S HISTORY and ASCENSION

China's meteoric rise cannot be adequately addressed without taking into account the history of the country and its people, and the course of events that led to its current state. Going back to the 15th century, the Ming Dynasty of China believed it was the center of the world and often departed on expeditions around the globe to display its vast wealth and technological advancements.ⁱ Over time, the Chinese came to believe they needed nothing economically from the rest of the world and that foreigners, labeled as "barbarians," would take advantage of them and disrupt their self-contained, self-reliant system.ⁱⁱ Additionally, they believed foreign intervention might expose their weaknesses, and also open the possibility for the Chinese people to collaborate with foreigners to overthrow the existing dynasty (which would later happen in 1644, when the Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Sing Dynasty).ⁱⁱⁱ Starting in 1433, China began to completely isolate itself from the rest of the world to the detriment of social and economic progress.^{iv}

China's closed-door policy lasted for several centuries until slowly European traders began to make some cracks in the door. By 1800, the single port of Canton was open to trade under tightly controlled conditions, strict trade laws, and with low trade volume.^v Over time the demand for Chinese products by Europeans was greater than any products the Europeans could export to this created a trade deficit for the British East India Company (one of the primary

trading partners in China) until opium was discovered as a means to balance the trade with China.^{vi} Though illegal, it quickly became one of the major Chinese imports. As the British East India Company increased its monopoly on the opium market, the trade with China grew, but much to the detriment of the Chinese people. The imperial government banned the sale, trade, and use of opium, but this did not limit the opium coming into the country. The push and pull of the opium trade with China would eventually lead to the first Opium War (1839-1842) that would force open five additional trading ports to foreign trade and residency, force China to pay an indemnity to Great Britain, and ceded the control of Hong Kong to the British.^{vii} The Second Opium War, (1856-1860), would force open an additional 10 ports for trading, officially legalize the opium trade, open the Yangtze River for trade, and incur an indemnity.

Internal rebellion, foreign influence, and natural disasters following the Opium Wars weakened the country. This culminated in the end of China's dynastic reign in 1912 with the establishment of the Republic of China.^{viii} Sun Yat-sen founded the Nationalist Party, also known as Kuomintang (KMT), later led by Chiang Kai-shek.^{ix} The opposing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 under the leadership of Mao Zedong and fought against the Nationalist Party. Eventually China became engulfed in World War II with the Japanese invasion. With the defeat of Japan in 1945, the civil war in China between the Nationalists and Communist parties resumed. In October of 1949, the CCP, under the leadership of Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China (PRC) forcing the Nationalist Party to evacuate to Taiwan where it established the Republic of China (ROC).

The years following the establishment of the PRC revealed Mao's desire to implement his Communist principles through social and economic reform. China's plan for development included the Five Year Plan (1953-1957) to collectivize agriculture and nationalize banking,

industry, and trade.^x This centralized the government and virtually eliminated private enterprise. Mao's Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) in subsequent years was aimed at achieving faster economic and technical development, but ended in failure.^{xi} In the decades to follow, there would be continuous struggle (e.g. the Great Cultural Revolution) between Mao and other more moderate party leaders (including Deng Xiaoping) as they attempted to take more moderate steps towards economic recovery while Mao's efforts were aimed at purifying the communist party and limiting capitalist influence. With the death of Mao in 1976, Deng was able to increase his influence on the CCP and began to enact steps towards improving the economy of the PRC. Deng's support of the Four Modernizations plan, which involved strengthening the fields of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology, as a way to achieve success would eventually alter the course of the PRC.^{xii} The focus had shifted to the achievement of economic goals as a measure of success vice political goals, thus economics not politics was in command.^{xiii}

With a progressive approach, China adopted liberal/western economic policies, privatized her economic activities, and expanded her international practices while still under the CCP's authoritarian regime. Deng Xiaoping's philosophy was one of "peace and development."^{xiv} Dr. John W. Garver, a specialist in Chinese foreign relations and Asian international relations, characterized Deng's approach to foreign relations as intending "to avoid ideological conflicts, and not to involve China in matters unrelated to its own immediate interests. Moreover, Deng sought to maintain good relations with all countries, especially those capable of assisting China's development – like the wealthy and technologically advanced capitalist countries of the West."^{xv}

Despite the economic success under Deng's leadership, political unrest due to party corruption, increased commercialism, and inflation led to the student uprising in Tiananmen

Square in 1989. Martial law was declared and the PRC military was ordered to clear the square, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties. The international reaction from the PRC's handling of the Tiananmen Square incident did little to alter the course of its growing economy. The United Nations (UN) declared that China was in violation of UN recognized human rights standards which; as a member, China is obligated to uphold. China countered that the involvement of the UN in internal affairs was unlawful. While the international reaction of condemnation of the Tiananmen Square incident was vocal and widespread, little beyond an arms embargo, on behalf of the United States and other European countries, was done to negatively impact the economy of the PRC.^{xvi} The priorities of China were once again clearly defined: economic success over political progress.

The fall of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1991 served as the principle lesson of futility for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).^{xvii} However, the fallout of the Tiananmen Square incident disrupted and delayed the CCP conservative economic implementation of policies for the 1990s. Dr. John W. Garver characterized the situation by stating, “the Soviet experience convinced the CCP leadership that centralized control, enforced egalitarianism, international isolation and ideological dogmatism was suicidal.”^{xviii}

The resolutions of the CCP's 15th Congress that met in September 1997 aimed at increasing privatization, opening the markets to the world, and diversifying the ownership structure within the country. This increased economic liberalization set the stage for the Chinese markets to expand by integrating into the world markets.^{xix} Succinctly, the CCP recognized the importance of Deng's logic. His vision coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union, set the conditions for China to privatize its markets and expand her international ventures while the CCP reinstated political control within the country.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

China, the world's fastest engine of economic growth, posted an 8.9% gain in the last quarter of 2011. Comparing this against the United States pedestrian 1.8% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) places China's growth into perspective.^{xx} China is steadily making significant end roads in closing the financial advantage the United States shares over its competitors and allies. Over the past quarter of a century, China's rise in economic power is unrivaled by any other nation. During this time, she has sustained a GDP surplus of 10%.^{xxi} The cascading effects from this boom are far reaching as evidenced by its trade surplus and holdings of United States debt. Increasing elements of her people are no longer impoverished and massive infrastructure projects have been completed throughout China's metropolitan areas. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to modernize and her government has substantial international influence.

In 2010, China became the second largest global economy.^{xxii} Similarly, China ranks as the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods in the world.^{xxiii} This explosive growth has had a deep effect on a country of more than 1.3 billion people, catapulting 400 million people out of poverty in the past two decades. If the current trends are maintained, economists predict China will supplant the United States as the world's largest economy by 2027.^{xxiv} China must be able to continue its rate of production and exportation of specialized goods at a relatively low cost to reach this milestone and achieve the competitive edge over the United States. This achievement would enable China to accomplish a strategic economic goal of making the Yuan the world's strategic reserve.^{xxv}

Over the past 20 years, China's exports tripled in profit over its G-20 counterparts.^{xxvi} To better understand this phenomenal growth, it is important to recognize China's pragmatic

approach. The country has steadily lessened its emphasis on agriculture, apparel, and textiles with electronics and machinery as the dominant goods exported today: China's export structure has thus become more specialized.

Studies suggest that China's movement into electronics and intricate machinery are unmistakable signals of their export sophistication.^{xxvii} The enhancement of China's exports in combination with the country's robust income growth leads many economists to believe the PRC will remain the largest technology era producer and exporter well into the 21st century.^{xxviii} The Chinese believe manufacturing more sophisticated products over simpler goods equals greater growth potential – producing ethanol engines over stalks of corn makes one unique and more appealing to the markets.^{xxix} In addition, the increased amount of processing trade (importing goods from foreign countries, and assembling them in China) has enabled China to produce highly sophisticated goods and increase its exports. The relatively low cost of labor and high number of skilled workers has enabled China to substantially benefit from processing trade.

The clear indicators of China's skilled exports are particularly challenging for the United States. The United States must balance its competition with China in the skilled export business. The Chinese hold a variety of advantages over the United States in the export market – lower employee wages, lax environmental regulations on manufacturers, and duty-free arrangements with regional partners.^{xxx} Additionally, China's increased export capacity has served to change the perception of China in the eyes on the world as a strong economic leader.^{xxxi} Only in collaboration with her private sector can the United States realistically compete with China's techno-savvy export market.

One of the key factors that have enabled China to grow at such an unprecedented rate and continue to attract increased trade partnerships is its tightly controlled currency value. The

Chinese currency system is referred to as the Renminbi, with the Yuan being the base unit of the Renminbi in which prices are measured.^{xxxii} The Chinese government has historically maintained tight control on the value of the Yuan to prevent marked fluctuations. The exchange rate of the Yuan has been fixed so that it is devalued against the U.S. dollar. If left free of such stringent government control, it is suggested by economists that the Yuan would appreciate against the U.S. dollar.^{xxxiii} This tight control of its monetary value creates a lack of balance in the global economy and has made foreign partners wary of China's intentions. While not limiting trade thus far, the intentions of China's actions have come under increasing scrutiny as economies throughout the globe deal with recessions and market swings. The consequence of keeping the Chinese Yuan fixed at a low rate is that goods produced in China are less expensive in America.^{xxxiv}

China's ability to export less expensive products due to its tightly managed exchange rate has enabled her to achieve such rapid economic growth. The Chinese implemented a "floating" currency system, which allows the rate to fluctuate with the market. However, this rate is never allowed to fluctuate more than 0.5 percent and is carefully monitored by the government.^{xxxv} This move gives the government the appearance of enacting change to appease their critics; however, Beijing still maintains tight control over its currency.

RELATIONSHIP WITH UNITED STATES

The exponential growth of bilateral trade between the United States and China has formed an interdependent relationship between the two countries. While trade has increased on both sides, United States imports from China have increased at an even higher rate resulting in an enormous trade deficit with China and consequently a negative impact on American jobs and wages.^{xxxvi} In 1980, the U.S. Congress passed the first trade agreement with China. This three-

year agreement granted China Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and encouraged business interactions via consulates and visits between the two countries.^{xxxvii} In the ensuing decade, trade between the United States and China increased and became less regulated. In 1989, the Tiananmen Square incident prompted questions concerning the United States' relationship with China. The human rights violations concerning this incident confounded lawmakers as to whether to revoke MFN status because of what occurred, or maintain China's MFN status to continue building on the growing economic relationship. After another decade of debate over how to deal with the China question, Beijing eventually joined the World Trade Organization and was granted permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with the United States.^{xxxviii} Despite the arms embargo placed on China by the United States and other European countries, the Tiananmen Square incident had little effect on Chinese trade relations with the United States and other global trading partners.

The relationship between the United States and China has been described as a “double-standard.” The United States did not push for human rights reform following the Tiananmen Square incident due to the strong economic relationship that had begun to serve as an essential element of the functioning of the United States economy.^{xxxix} In response to that, civil rights activists have asserted that in the case of economic interests versus human rights violations, economic interests would always take priority. Thus, American human rights activist Aryeh Neier characterized the United States/China policy as “reaching the point where the most ardent defenders of Chinese communism are United States capitalists.”^{xl} The ability for the United States to enforce trade sanctions against China in response to human rights violations is limited at best. In order for any sanctions by the United States to be effective, it would require universal enforcement and other countries to participate in those sanctions - if such could be negotiated. In

reality, the likelihood of other countries engaging in sanctions against China is virtually nonexistent.^{xli}

With China fully engrained as an essential trading partner with the United States, and free of worry for punishment over any human rights violations, the trade between the two has increased exponentially within the past two decades. This has resulted in a trade surplus for China, a booming economy in the PRC, and placed Beijing in a position to aid the United States by becoming its largest creditor. China now holds over \$1.30 trillion in United States Treasury debt.^{xlii} Consequently, China has also become the largest creditor nation in the world, lending assistance to other smaller debt-ridden countries such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy.^{xliii} However, it remains to be seen what the strategic motivations are behind China's recent involvement in global securities purchasing.

China has gradually built up its economy and foreign trade while seemingly promoting economic stability throughout the Pacific region. In recent years, the United States and other countries have become increasingly reliant on Chinese exports. While this reliance has taken a substantial toll on the United States job market by shifting manufacturing jobs from the domestic front to China, it has also become a huge factor in contributing to the success of other United States merchants and stores by providing cheap labor of manufactured goods.

The Chinese/United States relationship is thus a truly double-edged sword. The tentacles of the Chinese economy have become far-reaching and infinitely entangled in the future of the United States. While the United States ignores China's human rights violations, questions her nuclear growth, and is suspicious towards the PRC's military expansion, one cannot deny the obvious economic benefits China provides the United States. Moreover, China's increasing economic involvement throughout the world suggests its desire to create similar situations with

other countries. In such situations, China gains indirect power through reliance on their economy.

With the economy at the forefront of United States/China relationships, political and diplomatic ties cannot be ignored. The economic dependency has created a high threshold of tolerance as the two competitors negotiate diplomatic, military, and political interactions. As previously addressed, human rights have been roughly ignored by the United States for decades. By granting China MFN status in 1980, the United States eliminated its bargaining tool for demanding improvements in human rights. The consequence to this would be pulling the MFN status, which in essence would also hurt the United States by increasing tariffs on imports from China costing the United States billions of dollars. If MFN status was revoked and a policy shift occurred, the United States would suffer economically because of adherence to its ethical fitness standards by standing up for human rights. Ultimately, economic interests have prevailed, as China has done little to address the human rights issues in its country.^{xliv}

One of the most well known political discords between the United States and China is over the independence of the Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan. While the ROC has asserted its independence from mainland China and desires to exist as its own sovereign state, the PRC refuses to recognize Taiwan, and refers to its “One China Policy” since it views Taiwan as a breakaway province. Contentiously, the United States has supported the government of Taiwan as one of its main allies, but does not recognize it diplomatically. Since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the United States has sold arms and provided training to the ROC military. The relationship between the United States and the ROC thus remains a contentious issue with Beijing. In 2011, President Obama announced the plan of selling \$5.8 billion worth of military equipment to Taiwan.^{xlv} This decision had a two-fold purpose for the United States. First, it

fulfills legal obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”^{xlvi} Second, it strengthens a United States backed presence in the region that could potentially be used as a bargaining tool in the future. The PRC reaction to the news was none other than displeasure, with the Chinese Ambassador to Washington condemning the action and warning of the potential for further consequences.^{xlvii}

Neither the United States nor China can afford to impose and support economic sanctions against each other. Hence, this threat was unrealistic in its desired effectiveness and merely rhetoric. Still, these overlapping political and economic ties between the United States, China, and Taiwan create a tenuous situation. Since the Carter administration, the United States has always supported the independence of Taiwan while excluding official diplomatic recognition. Yet, as the economic dependence of the United States grows deeper with China, the pervasive challenge of maintaining a business friendly relationship has potential to fracture the existing relationship between Taiwan and the United States.

MILITARY GROWTH

Regional and global diplomatic relations between China and other nations are also becoming increasingly important to the United States. As the Chinese economy has grown to become the second largest in the world, China now has acquired economic influence on nations around the world. As China has also become more involved in the global economic community, its assertiveness has become more apparent. This growing influence raises concerns for the United States and other regional powers as to the future stability of China and has led to an increasing pattern of distrust between the two nations.^{xlviii} The increased economic and

diplomatic influence coupled with the recent expansion and modernization of the PLA has created cause for concern on behalf of the United States. Even with its highly valued economic relationship with the United States, the unknowns over China's nuclear policy, secrecy of its government operations, and modernizations of its military raise suspicion on behalf of the United States and the PRC's regional neighbors about the motivations of the country. While the Chinese say they support global stability on one hand, their actions often do not match their rhetoric.

The PLA has undergone significant modernization in recent years alongside the growing economy. The role of the PLA has extended into international peacekeeping efforts, counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.^{xlix} While the overall numbers of military equipment have decreased in recent decades, newer and more capable equipment has been introduced and older equipment purged from its inventory (See Appendices A, B, and C). Military equipment sophistication and modernization can be seen in their ballistic and cruise missile programs with new testing and upgrades.¹ The PLA Navy is equipped with increasingly modern multi-mission platforms with improved over-the-horizon targeting (OTH) capability (see Appendix A).^{li} The air and air defense forces of the PLA have revealed newer and more advanced aircraft, upgrading of their B-6 bomber fleet, development of airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, and an expansion of long-range advanced Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems (see appendix B).^{lii} PLA Ground forces consist of approximately 1.25 million personnel with modernization efforts focused on combat equipment to include their main battle tank, amphibious assault vehicles, and multiple rocket launchers (see appendix C).^{liii} In addition to the bolstering of traditional military equipment and forces, China has also significantly invested in the development of space and cyber capabilities.^{liv} The Chinese

government's published 2011 military budget ranks as the second largest in the world at about \$91 billion U.S. dollars.^{lv}

While the Pentagon reports increased modernization of the PLA, the exact extent of Chinese military capabilities remains a mystery.^{lvi} China's unwillingness to provide specifics on its military development raises concern in the United States and regional Asian countries. Yukio Edano, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, is quoted saying, "China's modernization of its military and increased activity is, along with insufficient transparency, a matter of concern."^{lvi} If the extent of Chinese military development and modernization is hidden under a veil of secrecy, the exact level of strength or weakness is not known. In keeping with the Chinese tradition, creating a sense of unknown in and of itself acts as a measure of security.

Gregory Kulacki, a senior analyst and China Project Manager at Union of Concerned Scientists, stated, "the fundamental purpose of China's nuclear arsenal is to prevent or counter foreign coercion."^{lviii} China's desire to maintain an upgraded nuclear inventory rests on the knowledge that it has a credible ability to retaliate against potential adversaries. The development and modernization of the Chinese nuclear inventory has occurred at a much slower pace and smaller scale than that of the United States.^{lix} The secrecy surrounding China's nuclear program could be in part intended to limit the knowledge of its weaknesses. The PRC uses the threat of knowing that they have a nuclear inventory as a negotiating piece, regardless of the extent of advancement of that capability. The likelihood of China employing any of its nuclear weapons remains low.

With their modernizations in technology, China has simultaneously engaged in an ever-increasing level of cyber warfare. China is committed to leveraging military and commercial resources to develop an extensive and all-inclusive cyber warfare program, not only to establish

its own networked architecture to coordinate military operations, but also for cyber attack, defense, and intelligence collection.^{lx} The Chinese military has realized the importance of Information Warfare (IW) in gaining dominance in a conflict and has focused significant effort in capabilities that would allow them to achieve information dominance.^{lxii} The aligning of the Chinese military efforts with commercial Chinese telecommunications firms allow access to supply networks. This sets up a particularly precarious situation for the United States, as consumers of Chinese electronics.^{lxii}

MOTIVATION TO INCREASE MILITARY CAPACITY

In the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident, Beijing recognized the need to modernize its forces after spending extensive periods without adequately funding her defense forces.^{lxiii} China has become the second largest financially backed military, second only to the United States. China is now confident in its state of security. As stated by national strategist Ni Lexiong, that China “has recovered the long lost confidence since the Opium War.”^{lxiv} Prior to the Opium Wars, China believed it was a strong and self-reliant empire, with no need for foreign intervention. The Opium Wars opened extensive trade with the west and opened China to the influence and technological advancements of western cultures. The Opium Wars shattered China’s long held feeling of superiority and their economy.

With China’s rapid economic success in recent decades, it now has the ability to invest in military and technological advancements that will provide the PRC with another chance to gain the security they lost during the Opium Wars. With the advent of the Opium Wars came the realization that China was severely lacking in scientific and technological advances due to its long history of self-induced isolation. With considerable western influence over the past several

decades, China now stands on a more even playing field. In contrast, their western counterparts increasingly feel their own sense of insecurity by being able to provide a credible fighting force.

Investing in the advancement of the PLA places border security as a necessary consideration due to regional powerhouse actors such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Regaining the lost confidence and security also means being able to adequately protect its own assets and have a credible military that can counter foreign threats if necessary. Taiwanese professor Ming-Yen Tsai suggests, “China is rising to challenge U.S. centered regional security arrangements, and seeking to challenge U.S. predominance.”^{lxv} China has also expressed an interest in increasing its power projection, most notably within the maritime realm.^{lxvi} With a significant interest in keeping sea lines of communication open for trade, the ability to secure these routes has become increasingly important to China.^{lxvii} Without the ability to secure these routes, the large presence of the United States Navy in the region has the ability to gain control and limit Chinese commerce.

Combining China’s sensational economic rise with its desire to regain control of Taiwan and the growing arsenal aimed at Taiwan cannot go unnoticed as a key point of importance for the Taiwan.^{lxviii} China’s strong economy is being used as an additional (if not subversive in nature) tool to gain access and control of Taiwan indirectly. By extending trade benefits and entrepreneurial opportunities for Taiwanese in mainland China, the opportunity for China to gain control in the distant future remains a possibility. Having a military presence to back up the political and economic influence will only strengthen its cause when the time comes.

With increased economic power comes the ability of having increased political and diplomatic influence. This influence cannot be as persuasive without the means of a credible military. Similarly, with increased valuable assets within their own borders, protection becomes

paramount. They must advance the PLA military to keep pace with the rest of the world and have a credible military to counter any outside threats.

CHINA'S WORLD VIEW/GLOBAL MESSAGE

China has consistently maintained its worldview is working towards harmonious and mutually beneficial relationships among nations to build a path towards prosperity. China's ideals leading to a harmonious world encompass four major efforts as outlined by current President of China Hu Jintao. The first is to "uphold multilateralism in order to realize common security."^{lxix} China believes wars are disastrous and wasteful for any country, thus efforts should be made to avoid them. Rather than conflict, negotiating resolutions under the security umbrella of the UN is preferred.^{lxx} The second is to "uphold mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve common prosperity."^{lxxi} Basically, if every country can achieve economic prosperity, all countries will benefit. The third is to "uphold the spirit of inclusiveness to build a harmonious world together."^{lxxii} Summarily stating that diversity is a good thing, differing political and social structures should be respected and outside intervention in a country's personal affairs is counterproductive to achieving a harmonious world. Finally, President Hu's fourth point, to "promote UN reform actively and prudently" is necessary to maintain the authority of the UN to deal with increasing global challenges.^{lxxiii}

In reviewing the goals of the Chinese government towards improving world peace, cooperation, security and stability, it is inherent to question the underlying motives of these statements before dismissing them as pure rhetoric. Sun Tzu's quote: "For to win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,"^{lxxiv} can be seen as an underlying motive for China promoting peace: subduing the enemy with the rhetoric of peace without ever having to engage the enemy. China is promoting peace,

which is what most countries (ideally) want, and at the same time asking for the respecting of political differences and avoiding outside intervention, which is what China wants. It would be easy to surmise that these statements are meant to promote the notion of a willing and open China committed to world peace and cooperation, but do these to hide the true motives and ambition of an increasingly powerful country?

The rapid rise of China has developed an increasing level of mistrust between the United States and China.^{lxxv} Wang Jisi, dean of international studies at Peking University and member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee within China's foreign ministry, described the Chinese distrust as "rooted in history and growing out of a belief that China has become a first-class global power in recent years. Chinese leaders believe the ultimate goal of United States leaders is to preserve American hegemony and the United States will work to prevent China's rise."^{lxxvi} Chinese distrust of foreign intervention dates back centuries with the culmination of that fear realized in the Opium Wars. As China has rebuilt its economy in recent decades and reclaimed her prominence, the fear of intervention that may destroy what it has built still exists.

With that fear comes an element of distrust on both sides. Kenneth Lieberthal, the National Security Director for Asia during the Clinton administration, discovered in talking with U.S. officials that he believed that "their Chinese counterparts think in terms of a zero-sum game."^{lxxvii} Lieberthal states, "U.S. worries stemming from that perception [of a zero sum game] permeate views on economic policy, cyber-intrusions, and defense systems that the American military sees as being developed specifically for U.S. targets."^{lxxviii} If taken in context to China's situation and history, these four points as outlined by President Hu, could be interpreted as giving the world what it wants (peace) in return for unfettered growth.

The first point advocates cooperation to avoid war. War for China would result in the dissolution of many vital economic relationships that are key to the success of the country. Likewise, China seems to be more effective at indirect methods towards acquiring power than direct confrontation. During the Opium Wars, China was defeated and humiliated by the overwhelming sophistication of the British and French forces. China has been able to regain its position of prominence on the world stage, not through military action but through growing and expanding its economy into global markets. Additionally, the secrecy of their military and internal operations would be revealed if the PRC were forced to engage in conflict. Secrecy of its military capabilities is of great importance to China. Keeping potential adversaries in the dark concerning its true capabilities and/or hiding its weaknesses is an essential tool in China's diplomatic strategy.

The second point encourages economic prosperity for all countries. Perhaps this is why China is the world's largest creditor nation. It desires to aid struggling economies and increase trade with those countries, while also encouraging easing of regional trade restrictions on behalf of the indebted nation. In so doing, not only is the indebted country pulled from its economic woes, but China also gains increased prosperity through gaining their business. Similarly, potential political allies on an international level are gained. By helping these less powerful countries economically, the PRC is in a position to influence them politically and in turn acquire their political favor on the international level. The promotion for economic prosperity even extends to its adversarial neighbor Taiwan. In 2010, Beijing and Taipei signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which slashed tariffs on hundreds of goods being traded between China and Taiwan.^{lxxix} Additionally, in 2012, China's Taiwan Affairs office announced that Taiwanese citizens would be able to register certain types of small

businesses in a number of Chinese cities and provinces.^{lxxx} This announcement comes at a time when Taiwan is facing negative growth in real wages and relatively high unemployment at home.^{lxxxii} China's promotion of economic prosperity directly benefits its own economy.

The third point speaks of respecting the individuality of each nation and the methods by which they achieve success. As a communist country with an emerging free enterprise and state directed economy, China has long been criticized for its oppressive nature towards its people despite its tremendous economic growth. Human rights violations have long plagued China and tarnished its image despite its success. “Realpolitik” principles can be interpreted as the motivation behind this third point. The politics of a country cannot be judged by ethical objectives, but by material and practical factors and exemplified by the realpolitik philosophy. Practically speaking, China has had enormous success under her authoritative communist regime with a free enterprise and state directed economy, despite the critical views of China's political system by the United States.

China is promoting these principals of “upholding the spirit of inclusiveness” to essentially protect its own system. The history of the Opium Wars is ever present. Opening the doors to foreigners proved disastrous to the Chinese economy and the country. In turn, the centuries of isolation from the west, leading up to the Opium Wars, was also detrimental to the development and progress of Chinese scientific and technological advancement. China wants limited interaction as it benefits its economy, but foreign involvement must end there. This third point is clearly meant as a way for China to protect its own way of conducting her internal affairs, while “seemingly” being respectful of the rest of the world.

The fourth point involves working towards promoting UN reform in an effort to “maintain the authority of the United Nations, improve its efficacy and give a better scope to

its role so that it will be better empowered to take on new threats and challenges,” as stated by President Hu.^{lxxxii} He further states that, “We should aim, as a priority, to increase representation of the developing countries.”^{lxxxiii} In effort to promote its principal of world peace, China understands the value of cooperation and expanding the authority of the UN to deal with new threats and challenges, but also ensuring peace and development for itself as well. Additionally, by promoting the authority of the UN, China is taking steps to perhaps limit an overt involvement on behalf of the United States in disrupting her own peace and development. As many Chinese leaders believe, according to the aforementioned Wang Jisi, the ultimate goal of the United States is to preserve itself as the leading power and will work to prevent China’s rise.^{lxxxiv} Efforts to negate the power of a single entity (the United States) through increasing the power of the UN and representation of smaller countries would preserve China’s growth, and regime stability without outside interference.

CHINA’S FUTURE

Despite China’s advocacy of a harmonious and peaceful world, the country itself remains an enigma. Its suppressive government, ongoing secrecy, overt manipulation of its currency, and its startling growth make it a concern for both the United States and regional countries. Efforts at world peace may not be pure rhetoric, for nothing would benefit China more than having increased international relationships without the threat of war. While China has never been overt in seeking out dominance or leadership on the global stage, it cannot be assumed that it never will. China has risen from the shadows to now cast a giant shadow. China’s increasing role as a creditor nation, along with growing trade partnerships throughout the world, has allowed it to establish its rising prominence in the global economy. China is gaining its power indirectly

through its growing influence via the economic elements of national power while simultaneously modernizing and professionalizing her armed forces.

China's history also provides clues to its future. While China is believed to have gained a renewed sense of security, lost during the Opium Wars, its wariness of foreign intervention remains as shown by the existing level of distrust between the United States and China.^{lxxxv} China's continued efforts at preserving its political structure and the secrecy of its technological and military developments would indicate that China is not likely to engage in any conflict that would extend beyond its borders. It does not want to reveal its weaknesses, nor lose its economic advantage, through the risk of armed conflict. Clearly China's strength is its economy and it uses this as its mean of projecting its power.

UNITED STATES' CONSIDERATIONS

The United States' course of action following the unprecedented rise of China should be one of caution and closeness. The potential for military action between China and the United States in the near future can be assessed as low due to the economic risks on both sides. However, the long-term future is unpredictable. As China will likely continue to focus on expanding its economy as a means of gaining indirect power, the United States must proceed cautiously with its economic entanglement with China. As China makes moves to improve and expand the economy, cracks in the system will begin to be revealed. If China's economy were to crash, reverberations would be felt around the world in the form of another recession.^{lxxxvi} The United States must begin to gradually draw back its foreign investment in China, limit the sale of debt securities to China, and focus on bringing manufacturing back to the United States. China's rate of growth cannot feasibly continue without stumbling blocks.

Maintaining a strong military and regional presence is essential for the United States in dealing with such a large, growing, and unpredictable nation such as China. Beijing's desire to regain possession of Taiwan and the desire for power projection in the region, specifically in the maritime arena, suggest the potential for increased military movement by the PLA in the future.^{lxxxvii} The United States must continue to show its strength through its military. Additionally, the United States must maintain a military relationship and presence among its allies in the region. Establishing and maintaining a military relationship with China itself serves as important piece in maintaining peace and establishing cooperation in the region. In June 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that, "the Defense Department wants what both presidents Obama and Hu want: sustained and reliable military-to-military contacts at all levels that can help reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding, and the risks of miscalculation."^{lxxxviii}

China's history of western engagement combined with its more recent rise to economic prominence creates a precarious situation. The secrecy behind China's technological and military advancements and its unknown intentions for the future, create a difficult situation for the United States to prepare for. China's inherent fear of foreign involvement in internal matters, stemming from before, during, and after the Opium Wars, leads to mistrust of Western influence and motives. China has been able to gain increasing prominence in the international community through gaining indirect power through its economic influence. The increasing strength of its economy, inherent fear, secrecy, and mistrust create a unique challenge for the United States. While intimately entangled in the fate of the Chinese economy, the United States must gradually reduce its dependency through drawing back investment in China, limiting the sale of debt securities to China, and gradually moving manufacturing back to the United States. By drawing

back involvement in China's economy, the United States will reduce the risk should that economy collapse as such rapid growth is not sustainable. Additionally, on the military front, it is important for the United States to maintain a strong presence in the Asia-Pacific region and continue to maintain relationships with its allies in the region. Establishing military to military ties with the PLA, while slow and tedious, are also essential for the United States to better understand the motives and capabilities of their Chinese counterparts.

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Appendix A: PLA Navy (PLAN) Inventory

Author notes: No longer are the Chinese considered a brown water navy. The modernization of the PLAN over the past decade has been driven by two factors, the possibility of a military conflict with Taiwan over the island's declaration of independence, and more recently, the growing needs to protect her SLOCs in order to secure the country's global network of energy resources and trading activities. At this point in time, the PLAN has substantial anti-access/active denial platforms. Many military strategists predict the PLAN will possess a global navy by the midpoint of the 21st century.

APPENDIX A – PLAN Inventory

| Chinese Warships | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Class | Source | Inventory | | | | | | | | |
| | | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2011 | 2015 | 2020 |
| <u>Submarines</u> | | 117 | 63 | 48 | 50 | 55 | 62 | 63 | 71 | 78 |
| SSB Ballistic Missile Submarines | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| <u>SSBN Jin</u> | Type 094 | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 |
| <u>SSBN Xia</u> | Type 092 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| <u>SSB Golf</u> | Type 031 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| SSN Nuclear Attack Submarines | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| <u>SSN NEWCON</u> | Type 095 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 3 |
| <u>SSN Shang</u> | Type 093 | - | - | - | - | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| <u>SSN Han</u> | Type 091 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| <u>SS Conventional Submarines</u> | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| <u>SS Kilo</u> | <u>Sov Kilo</u> | - | - | 1 | 4 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| <u>SS NEWCON</u> | <u>Song / Yuan</u> | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 | 20 |
| <u>SS Yuan</u> | Type 041 | - | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>SS Song</u> | Type 039 | - | - | - | 1 | 10 | 14 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| <u>SS Ming</u> | Type 035 | 2 | 3 | 10 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 15 | 12 |
| <u>SS Wuhan</u> | Type 033G | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>SS Romeo</u> | Type 033 | 90 | 53 | 29 | 20 | 7 | 6 | - | - | - |
| <u>SS Whiskey</u> | Type 03 | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Aircraft Carrier | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 2 |
| <u>CV NEWCON</u> | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| <u>Shi Lang ex-Varyag</u> | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| <u>ATS Shichang</u> | (Multirole Aviation) | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>Destroyers</u> | | 15 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 24 | 27 | 26 | 25 | 26 |
| <u>DDG NEWCON</u> | Type 05xx | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 | 6 |
| <u>DDG Luzhou</u> | Type 051C | - | - | - | - | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>DDG Hangzhou</u> | <u>Sovremenny</u> | - | - | - | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| <u>DDG Luyang II</u> | Type 052C | - | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 6 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>DDG Luyang I</u> | Type 052B | - | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>DDG Luhai</u> | Type 052A | - | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>DDG Luhu</u> | Type 052 | - | - | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>DDG Luda</u> | Type 051 | 11 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 11 | 6 | 2 |
| <u>DD Anshan</u> | Type 07 | 4 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Frigates | | 31 | 37 | 32 | 40 | 46 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 |
| <u>FFG Jiangkai</u> | Type 054 | - | - | - | - | 2 | 6 | 12 | 22 | 28 |
| <u>FFG Jiangwei III</u> | Type 059 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>FFG Jiangwei II</u> | Type 057 | - | - | 2 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| <u>FFG Jiangwei I</u> | Type 055 | - | - | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| <u>FFG Jianghu</u> | Type 053 | 20 | 26 | 26 | 30 | 30 | 27 | 21 | 11 | 5 |
| <u>FFG Jiangdong</u> | Type 053K | 2 | 2 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>FF Jiangnan</u> | Type 053 [mod- <u>Sov Riga</u>] | 5 | 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>FF Chengdu</u> | Type 01 [ex- <u>Sov Riga</u>] | 4 | 4 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Guided Missile Boats | | 212 | 213 | 222 | 94 | 82 | 111 | 84 | 94 | 94 |
| <u>PCFG NEWCON</u> | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>PCFG Houbei</u> | Type 022 | - | - | - | - | 4 | 40 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| <u>PCFG C-14 Cat</u> | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>PCFG Hola / Hela</u> | Type 021-mod | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| <u>PCFG Houku / Hegu</u> | Type 024 [<u>Komar</u>] | 90 | 90 | 90 | 30 | 30 | 20 | - | - | - |
| <u>PCFG Huangfeng / Hounan /</u> | Type 021 [<u>Osa</u>] | 120 | 120 | 120 | 38 | 20 | 20 | - | - | - |
| <u>Houdong</u> | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>PGG Homa</u> | Type 024-mod | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| <u>PGG Houjian / Huang</u> | Type 037-II | - | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| <u>PGG Houxin</u> | Type 037-IG | - | - | 9 | 20 | 22 | 25 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| <u>PGG Molniya</u> | <u>Molniya</u> | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Torpedo Boats | | 230 | 190 | 120 | 16 | 9 | 9 | - | - | - |
| <u>PHT Huchuan</u> | Type 025 | 120 | 100 | 100 | 16 | 9 | 9 | - | - | - |
| <u>PHT P-6</u> | | 60 | 60 | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>PHT P-4</u> | | 50 | 30 | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Patrol Boats | | 420 | 440 | 440 | 221 | 233 | 235 | 231 | 221 | 204 |
| <u>PC Haiqing</u> | Type 037-IS | - | - | 5 | 15 | 28 | 30 | 36 | 46 | 56 |
| <u>PC Hailiu</u> | Type 037-I | - | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - |
| <u>PC Hainan</u> | Type 037 | 45 | 90 | 95 | 95 | 88 | 88 | 78 | 68 | 58 |
| <u>PC Shanghai III / Haizhui</u> | Type 062/1 | - | 10 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 10 |
| <u>PC Shanghai II</u> | Type 062 | 325 | 300 | 300 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 90 | 80 |
| PG Kronshtadt | Kronshtadt | 20 | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| PC Shanghai I | | 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>PC Huludao</u> | Type 206 | - | 5 | 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>PC Shantou / Swatow</u> | | 25 | 25 | 25 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Mine Warfare | | 136 | 126 | 116 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 90 |
| <u>MST Wolei / Buliejian</u> | (minelayer) | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>MSO Type 010</u> | Type 010 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 27 | 12 | 10 | - | - | - |
| <u>MSO Type 010 [RESERVE]</u> | Type 010 [Sov T-43] | - | - | - | 13 | 28 | 30 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
| <u>MSC Wosao</u> | Type 082 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| <u>MSC Fushun / Shanghai-II</u> | (minesweeper-coastal) | 20 | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>MSC Lianyun</u> | (minesweeper-coastal) | 80 | 80 | 80 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| <u>MSB Futi</u> | Type 312 (drone) | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Amphibious Warfare Ships</u> | | 37 | 36 | 36 | 26 | 33 | 37 | 39 | 52 | 54 |
| <u>LHA NEWCON</u> | Type 07x | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 3 |
| <u>LPD Yuzhao</u> | Type 071 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| <u>LST Yuting</u> | Type 072 III | - | - | - | - | 4 | 8 | 12 | 20 | 25 |
| <u>LST Yuting</u> | Type 072 II | - | - | 1 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| <u>LST Yukan</u> | Type 072 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 5 |
| <u>LST Shan</u> | US LST-1 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 3 | 3 | 3 | - | - | - |
| <u>LSM Yudeng</u> | Type 073 III | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| <u>LSM Yudao</u> | Type 073 II | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| <u>LSM Hua</u> | US LSM-1 | 15 | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>APA Qiongsha</u> | (attack transport) | - | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| <u>AH Qiongsha</u> | (hospital ship) | - | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>AH Shichang</u> | (Multirole Aviation) | - | - | - | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>AH Anwei</u> | Type 920 (hospital ship) | - | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| AH (hospital ship) | <u>Project 320</u> Russian | - | - | - | - | - | ? 1 | ? 1 | ? 1 | ? 1 |
| <u>AH 30,000 ton</u> | | - | - | - | - | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
| <u>Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT)</u> | | ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ | ++ |
| Amphibious Warfare Craft | | 429 | 401 | 406 | 369 | 349 | 339 | 305 | 305 | 305 |
| <u>LCU Yuhai/Wuhu</u> | Type 074 | - | - | - | 12 | 14 | 15 | 20 | 25 | 30 |
| <u>LCU Yulian/Yuliang/Yuling</u> | Type 079 | 23 | 30 | 30 | 31 | 31 | 31 | 25 | 20 | 15 |
| <u>LCM Yuchin/Yuqin/Yuchai</u> | Type 068/069 | 45 | 40 | 40 | 20 | 8 | 8 | - | - | - |
| LCM Yuchin [RESERVE] | Type 068/069 | | + | + | + | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| <u>LCM Yunnan</u> | Type 067 | 300 | 320 | 320 | 45 | 36 | 25 | - | - | - |
| LCM Yunnan [RESERVE] | Type 067 | + | + | + | 230 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| <u>LCM Type 271</u> | | ?? | ?? | ?? | ?? | ?? | ?? | ?? | ?? | ?? |
| LCM | US LCM-6 | 50 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| LCT | US LCT-6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>LCAC Dagu</u> | Type 722-II | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>LCAC Jingsah II</u> | Type 724 | - | - | 5 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| Surveillance | | 34 | 42 | 42 | 47 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 43 |
| <u>AGI Dongdiao</u> | (electronic reconnaissance) | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>AGI Dadie / Beidiao</u> | (electronic reconnaissance) | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| <u>AGI Yanbing [Mod Yanha]</u> | (electronic reconnaissance) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| <u>AGI Yanha / Haibing</u> | (electronic reconnaissance) | - | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | - | - |
| AGI NEWCON | (electronic reconnaissance) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 4 | 4 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>AGI Xing Fengshan / Xiangyang Hong</u> | (intelligence collection) | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| AGI NEWCON | (intelligence collection) | - | - | - | - | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| <u>AGM Yuan Wang</u> | (space event ship) | - | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| <u>AGOR Xiang Yang Hong</u> | (Oceanographic Research) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| <u>AGOR Haiyang</u> | (Oceanographic Research) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGOR Yanqian (mod-Kansha)</u> | (Oceanographic Research) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - |
| AGOR NEWCON | (Oceanographic Research) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 | 9 | 9 |
| <u>AGS Yannan</u> | (Surveying) (buoy tender) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | - | - | - |
| AGS NEWCON | (Surveying) (buoy tender) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Support | | 174 | 166 | 173 | 164 | 155 | 154 | 142 | 140 | 135 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| ADG Yen Pai | (degaussing) | - | - | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| ADG Yenka | (degaussing) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - |
| ADG Yen Fang | (degaussing) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Replenishment | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| <u>AF Danyao</u> | (Ammunition Replenishment) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AOE Qiandaohu / Fuchi</u> | (Underway Replenishment) | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| <u>AOR Nanyun / Nancang</u> | (Underway Replenishment) | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>AOR Fuqing</u> | (Underway Replenishment) | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - |
| AK | Cargo | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| <u>AK Yantai</u> | (cargo) | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>AK Dayun</u> | Type 904 (cargo) | - | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| AK Damen | (cargo) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| AK Hongqi | (cargo) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| AK Danlin | (cargo) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | - | - | - | - |
| AK Yukan | (cargo) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AK Galati</u> | (cargo) (Romanian) | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AK Zhandou 59 | (cargo) | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AK FS-331 | (cargo) (US Army) | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AK NEWCON | (cargo) | - | - | - | - | 5 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 10 |
| AK/AOT Dandao | (cargo / transport oiler) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | - | - | - |
| AK/AOT Danlin | (cargo / transport oiler) | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | - | - |
| AK/AOT NEWCON | (cargo / transport oiler) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 16 | 16 |
| AOH | (small harbor oiler) | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| <u>AOTL Leizhou</u> | (coastal transport oiler) | 5 | 5 | 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AOTL Shengli</u> | (coastal transport oiler) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - |
| AOTL Guangzhou | (coastal transport oiler) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | - | - | - |
| <u>AOTL Jinyou</u> | (coastal transport oiler) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | - | - | - |
| <u>AOTL Fulin / Mettawee</u> | (coastal transport oiler) [US] | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AOTL Fuzhou</u> | (coastal transport oiler) | 14 | 14 | 14 | - | - | - | - | - | - |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| AOTL 2-TM | (coastal transport oiler) | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AOTL NEWCON | (coastal transport oiler) | - | - | - | 10 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| ARC Wulai | (cable repair) | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>ARC Youzhong Class</u> | (small cable ship) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | - | - |
| <u>ARC Youdian</u> | (cable ship) | 3 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| ARL Galati | (repair) (Romanian) | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ARL Achelous | (repair) (U.S.) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>ARS Daozha</u> | (large salvage tug) | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ARS Dadong | (salvage) | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ARS Dadao | (salvage) | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ARS Ten Ting | (salvage) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ARS Kansha | (salvage) | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ARS Jin Jian Xun | (salvage) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ARS NEWCON | (salvage) | - | - | - | - | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| <u>AS Dazhi</u> | (submarine support) | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>ASL Dazhou</u> | (Submarine Tender, Small) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - | - |
| <u>ASR Dajiang</u> | (submarine rescue) | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | - | - | - | - |
| <u>ASR Dalang</u> | (submarine rescue) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| <u>ASR Hudang / Hudung / Hudong</u> | (submarine rescue) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| ASR NEWCON | (submarine rescue) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| AT Yan Jiu | (ocean going tug) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| AT Yung Gang | (ocean going tug) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| <u>AT Gromovoy</u> | (ocean going tug) (Soviet) | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 17 | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AT Roslavl</u> | (ocean going tug) (Soviet) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AT Dinghai</u> | (ocean going tug) | 3 | 3 | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AT Yanting | (ocean going tug) | 3 | 3 | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AT FT-14 | (ocean going tug) (ex-trawler) | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AT Sotoyomo | (ocean going tug) [US] | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AT "254-Design" | (ocean going tug) (U.S. Army) | 2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| AT NEWCON | (ocean going tug) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| <u>ATA Hujiu</u> | (auxiliary ocean tug) | 4 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 4 | - |
| <u>ATA Tuzhong</u> | (auxiliary ocean tug) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | - | - | - |
| ATA NEWCON | (auxiliary ocean tug) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4 | 8 | 12 | 12 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| AWL Fuzhou | (coastal water transport) | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 4 | - | - |
| AWL Leizhou | (coastal water transport) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | - | - |
| AWL NEWCON | (coastal water transport) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 | 13 | 13 |
| AWT Fulin | (replenishment ship) | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 4 | - | - |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| AWT Fuzhou | (replenishment ship) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 4 | - |
| AWT NEWCON | (replenishment ship) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7 | 15 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| <u>AX Daxin / Dakin</u> | (training ship) | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| <u>IX Yanxi / YenHsi</u> | (weapons trial support) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - |
| <u>IX Test 970</u> | (weapons trial support) | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Auxiliary, Merchant Marine | Survey / Research / Exp | 32 | 31 | 33 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 30 | 30 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| <u>AGE Dahua</u> | (research) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| <u>AGE Xiangyanghong 5</u> | (experimental) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| <u>AGE Ji Di Hao</u> | (research) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| AGOR NEWCON | (survey / research) | - | - | - | 4 | 4 | 4 | 13 | 14 | 21 |
| <u>AGOR Dong Fang Hong</u> | (oceanographic research) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| <u>AGOR Hai</u> | (oceanographic research) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| <u>AGOR Kexue Hao / Hai Ying</u> | (oceanographic research) | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - |
| <u>AGOR Huanghai 11</u> | (oceanographic research) | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGOR Shijian</u> | (oceanographic research) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - | - |
| <u>AGOR Shuguang 04</u> | (oceanographic research) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | - | - | - |
| <u>AGOR Shukuang</u> | (oceanographic survey) | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGOR Yanlun</u> | (oceanographic research) | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| <u>AGOR Kan</u> | (oceanographic research) | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| AGS NEWCON | (survey) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| <u>AGS Ganzhu / Kanzhu</u> | (survey) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | - | - |
| <u>AGS Kaiboban</u> | (survey) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGS King Hai</u> | (survey) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGS Nan Hai Class</u> | (geophysical research) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGS Shuguang 01</u> | (hydrographic survey) Mod-T-43 MSO | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| <u>AGS Yanlai</u> | (survey) | 3 | 3 | 4 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGS Yenlai</u> | (survey) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | - | - | - |
| <u>AGS Yenlun</u> | (survey) | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGS Flower</u> | (hydrographic survey) (British) | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>AGSC Kan Yang / Hace</u> | (coastal survey) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | - |

Appendix B: PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Inventory

Author notes: PLAAF is in the midst of a transition between the limited, large “Air Defense” force it used to be. Today the PLAAF is an advanced force with modern equipment, updated doctrine, and capabilities. PGMs, support aircraft, and C4ISR platforms support CAS and deep air interdiction missions. Clearly, China is capable of undertaking offensive strikes against ground and naval targets beyond her borders.

APPENDIX B – PLAAF Inventory

| People's Liberation Army Air Force PLAAF Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----------------------|
| Aircraft | Source | Inventory | | | | | | | | | | <u>Modernization</u> |
| | | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2003 | 2005 | 2010 | 2011 | 2015 | 2020 | |
| <u>H - Hongzhaji (Bomber)</u> | | 620 | 470 | 500 | 320 | 160 | 120 | 100 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |
| <u>H-9</u> | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ??? |
| <u>H-8</u> | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ??? |
| <u>H-6</u> | BADGER | <u>Tu-16</u> | <u>YJ-6</u> | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |
| <u>H-5</u> | BEAGLE | <u>Il-28</u> | <u>YJ-8</u> | 500 | 350 | 380 | 200 | 40 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Q - Qiangjiji (Attack)</u> | | Armamen | 500 | 500 | 500 | 558 | 478 | 400 | 360 | 300 | 300 | 315 |
| | | t | | | | | | | | | | 325 |
| <u>Q-7</u> | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ??? |
| <u>J-11B</u> | FLANKE | <u>Su-</u> | -- | -- | -- | | | | 18 | 24 | 48 | 75 |
| R | | <u>30MK</u> | | | | | | | | | | 100 |
| | | <u>K</u> | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <u>Su-30MK</u> | FLANKE R | <u>Su-30MK</u> | -- | -- | -- | 38 | 58 | 76 | 73 | 73 | 70 | 65 | 60 |
| <u>K</u> | | <u>K</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>JH-7</u> | FBC-1 | <u>YJ-8 + PL-8</u> | -- | -- | -- | 20 | 20 | 25 | 72 | 72 | 120 | 165 | 160 |
| <u>Q-5</u> | FANTAN | | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 400 | 300 | 150 | 120 | 50 | - | - |
| <u>J - Jianjiji (Fighter)</u> | | Armamen | 4,13 | 4,00 | 4,00 | 2,50 | 1,07 | 1,10 | 1,00 | 1,10 | 1,10 | 1,10 | 1,10 |
| | | t | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4th Generation | | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 10 | 20 | 96 |
| <u>J-21</u> | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 5 | 10 | 48 |
| <u>J-20</u> | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 5 | 10 | 48 |
| 3rd Generation | | | | -- | -- | 22 | 48 | 45 | 48 | 235 | 282 | 475 | 700 |
| <u>J-11A</u> | FLANKE R | <u>Su-27SK</u> | <u>AA-11</u> | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 73 | 95 | 192 | 312 |
| <u>Su-27SK</u> | FLANKE R | <u>Su-27SK</u> | <u>AA-11</u> | -- | -- | 22 | 48 | 45 | 38 | 43 | 43 | 40 | 25 |
| <u>J-10</u> | Lavi | <u>PL-7 / PL-10</u> | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 10 | 120 | 144 | 240 | 360 | 480 |
| 2nd Generation | | | | 3230 | 3550 | 3600 | 2450 | 1034 | 1050 | 764 | 815 | 600 | 400 |
| <u>J-8</u> | FINBACK | <u>PL-2 / PL-7 / PL-9</u> | 30 | 50 | 100 | 150 | 184 | 200 | 264 | 240 | 200 | 100 | - |
| <u>J-7</u> | FISHBED | <u>MiG-21</u> | <u>PL-2 / PL-7</u> | 200 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 575 | 400 | 300 |
| <u>J-6</u> | FARMER | <u>MiG-19</u> | <u>PL-1 / PL-2</u> | 3000 | 3000 | 3000 | 1800 | 350 | 350 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 1st Generation | | | | 900 | 400 | 400 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>J-5</u> | FRESCO | <u>MiG-17</u> | <u>PL-1</u> | 400 | 400 | 400 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>F-2</u> | FAGOT | <u>MiG-15</u> | | 500 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| RECONNAISSANCE / ELECTRONIC WARFARE | | | | 300 | 290 | 150 | 175 | 180 | 200 | 200 | 46 | 46 | 10 |
| <u>Y-8</u> | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| HZ-5 | H-5 | | | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | - | - | - | - | - |
| JZ-8 | J-8 | | | | | | 20 | 20 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | - |
| JZ-7 | | | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | - | - | - | - | - |
| <u>JZ-6</u> | MiG-19R | | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 72 | 60 | - | - | - |
| JZ-5 | J-5 | | | 150 | 150 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| | <u>Tu-154M</u> | | | | | 2 | 4 | 4 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Airborne Early Warning (AEW) | | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 8 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 16 |
| <u>KJ-XX</u> | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ? | ? | ? | ? |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------------------------|--|---------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>KJ-</u> | | <u>IL-76</u> | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 4 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 8 |
| <u>2000</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>KJ-200</u> | CUB | <u>An-12</u> | | | | -- | -- | -- | 4 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 8 |
| TANKER | | | -- | -- | + | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 20 | 30 |
| <u>HY-XX</u> | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ? | 10 | 20 |
| HY-6 | | | -- | -- | -- | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| MIDAS | | <u>IL-78M</u> | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Y - Yunshuji (Transport)</u> | Capacity | | 550 | 430 | 460 | 485 | 513 | 519 | 343 | 350 | 275 | 280 | 280 |
| | Heavy | | .. | .. | 10 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 18 | 23 | 43 | 68 |
| <u>Y-XX</u> | | <u>An-70</u> | 60 tons | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 5 | 25 | 50 |
| | | | ?? | | | | | | | | | | |
| CANDID | | <u>Il-</u> <u>76MD</u> | 57 tons | - | - | 10 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| | | | Medium | .. | 25 | 25 | 68 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 40 | 40 | 65 |
| <u>Y-YY</u> | | | 25 tons | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 5 | 40 |
| <u>Y-9</u> | | | 30 tons | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | .. | 20 | 60 |
| <u>Y-8</u> | CUB | <u>An-12</u> | 20 tons | | 25 | 25 | 68 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 40 | 40 | - |
| | | | Light | .. | 375 | 400 | 375 | 425 | 425 | 235 | 240 | 170 | 130 |
| <u>Y-14</u> | CURL | <u>An-26</u> | 6 tons | | | | | | | | - | - | - |
| <u>Y-12</u> | | | 1 ton | | 25 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| <u>Y-11</u> | | | 1 ton | | + | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| <u>Y-7</u> | COKE | <u>An-24</u> | 6 tons | | 20 | 25 | 45 | 93 | 93 | 41 | 41 | 40 | 40 |
| <u>Y-5</u> | COLT | <u>An-2</u> | 2 tons | | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 170 | 170 | 100 | 60 |
| | | | <u>C-47</u> | | 50 | 50 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| | | | Li-2 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | Passenger | .. | 28 | 28 | 25 | 25 | 32 | 46 | 49 | 42 | 42 |
| | | | <u>Tu-</u> <u>154M</u> | 150 pax | -- | -- | -- | 15 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| | | | <u>Boeing</u> <u>737-</u> <u>200</u> | 128 pax | -- | -- | -- | 6 | 6 | 8 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| | | | <u>Il-18</u> | 110 pax | | 10 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | - |
| | | | <u>BAe</u> Trident <u>1E/2E</u> | 100 pax | | 18 | 18 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| | | | <u>CL-601</u> | 10 pax | -- | -- | -- | 2 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 15 | 20 |
| TRAINING | | | | + | + | + | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 260 | .. | .. |
| | | | Jet - Advanced | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| <u>Su-</u> <u>27UBK</u> | | <u>Su-</u> <u>27UBK</u> | | -- | -- | 2 | 12 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 32 | .. | .. |
| HJ-5 | | <u>H-5</u> | | | + | + | + | + | + | + | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>JJ-7</u> | | <u>J-7</u> | | -- | -- | -- | + | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | .. | .. |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|----|----|----|
| <u>JJ-6</u> | <u>J-6</u> | | + | + | + | + | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | |
| <u>JJ-5</u> | <u>J-5</u> | | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | |
| JJ-4 | MiG- | | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | |
| | 17U | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>JJ-2</u> | MiG- | | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | |
| (FT-2) | 15UTI | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jet - Intermediate | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| <u>JL-15</u> | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 10 | 25 | 50 | |
| <u>JL-9</u> | | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | |
| <u>JL-8</u> | <u>K-8</u> | | -- | -- | -- | + | 8 | 10 | 40 | 40 | .. | .. | |
| Piston | | | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | |
| <u>CJ-7</u> | | | | | | | | | | -- | -- | -- | |
| <u>CJ-6</u> | Yak-18 | | + | + | + | + | + | + | 400 | 400 | .. | .. | |
| <u>CJ-5</u> | Yak-18 | | + | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | .. | .. | |
| <u>Z - Zhishengji</u> | GTOW | 400 | 400 | 400 | 210 | 100 | 100 | ~400 | 200 | .. | .. | .. | |
| <u>(VTOL/Helicopter)</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Transport - Intermediate | | 10-ton | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| | <u>AS-332</u> | 10-ton | | 6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | | | |
| <u>Mi-171</u> | <u>Mi-171</u> | 13-ton | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. |
| | <u>Mi-17</u> | 12-ton | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 50 | 50 | .. | .. | .. |
| | <u>[Mi- 8MT]</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | <u>HIP H</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Z-8</u> | <u>SA 321</u> | 13-ton | 15 | 15 | 15 | -- | -- | -- | 7 | + | .. | .. | .. |
| Transport - Medium | | 5-ton | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| <u>Z-9</u> | <u>SA 360</u> | 5-ton | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 20 | .. | .. | .. |
| | Bell | 5-ton | | 4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | | | | |
| | | 214 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>UAV</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ASN- | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. |
| 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ASN- | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. |
| 104 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ASN- | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. |
| 206 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| W-50 | | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| WZ-5 | | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| D-4 | | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| NPU | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>WZ-6</u> | <u>BZK- 006</u> | | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | -- | + | + | .. | .. | .. |

Appendix C: PLA Ground Forces Inventory

Author notes: Over the past two decades, the PLA saw some significant reductions and restructure of its personnel and equipment, resulting in a smaller, but more capable army with improved mobility and firepower. Areas of advancement include: reconnaissance, SAM, SF, army aviation, and EW elements.

APPENDIX C – PLA Ground Forces Inventory

| Army Equipment | | Overview Inventory - Army Aviation | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|--|----------------------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | ARMY | | | | | | | |
| SYSTEM | | Inventory | | | | | | | |
| | | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2003 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 |
| ARMOR | | 11,400 | ~11,000 | ~11,000 | ~11,000 | ~7,800 | ~7,010 | ~6,550 | ~7,010 |
| Category A | | | | | 3,000 | | | | |
| Category B Reserve | | | | | ~8,000 | | | | |
| Type | ZTZ99 | 125mm gun, 54 | T-72 | -- | -- | -- | -- | | |
| 99 | | tons | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| Type | WZ-98 | 125mm gun, 50 tons | T-72 | -- | -- | -- | ~18 | ~80 | ~80 | ~250 | 340 |
| Type | IS-2 | 122mm gun, 46 tons | IS-2 | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Type | 80 | 105mm gun, 38 tons | | -- | + | + | 500 | 1,000? | 1,000 | 500 | 1,000 |
| Type | 69 | 105mm gun, 36 tons | | 200 | ~200 | ~800 | 1,200 | ~300 | ~300 | ~300 | ~300 |
| Type | 59 | 100mm gun, 36 tons | T-54 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 | ~4000 | ~4000 |
| T-34/85 | | 85mm gun, 32 tons | T-34 | 700 | 700 | 700 | 700 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| LIGHT TANKS | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 63 | 85mm gun, 18 tons | PT-76 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 700 | 600 | 400 | ~400 |
| Type | 62 | 85mm gun, 21 tons | | 800 | 800 | 800 | 800 | 800 | 400 | 400 | ~400 |
| ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLES | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | ZBD-97 | APC tracked - 6 road wheels | BMD-3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Type | YW-89 | APC tracked - 5 road wheels | | -- | -- | -- | 1,300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Type | ZBL-09 | APC wheeled - 8 road wheels | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 100 | 100 |
| Type | ZTD-05 | 105mm gun, tracked | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ~200 | ~200 |
| Type | ZBD-05 | APC tracked - 6 road wheels | BMD-3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ~200 | -- |
| Type | ZBD-04 | APC tracked - 6 road wheels | | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ~300 | -- |
| Type | ZBD-03 | APC tracked - 5 road wheels | ZSL2000 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 40 | -- |
| ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | YW-90 | APC tracked - 5 road wheels | | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | + | + |
| Type | WZ-86 | APC tracked - 6 road wheels | BMP-1 | + | + | + | + | 1,000 | 1,000 | 600 | + |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Type | YW- | APC tracked - 5 | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 85 | 307 | road wheels | | | | | | | | | |
| M- | WZ- | APC wheeled - 6 x | + | + | + | + | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| 1984 | 523 | 6 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type- | WZ- | APC wheeled - 6 x | -- | -- | + | + | 600 | 600 | 600 | 600 | |
| 92 | 551 | 6 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | | APC tracked - 6 | BTR-50 | + | + | + | + | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| 77 | | road wheels | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | YW- | APC tracked - 4 | | 2,800 | 2,800 | 2,200 | 1,800 | 2,300 | 2,500 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| 63 | 531 | road wheels | | | | | | | | | |
| | | APC tracked - 5 | BMD-3 | -- | -- | -- | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| | | road wheels | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | | APC wheeled - 6 x | BTR-152 | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 56 | | 6 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | | APC wheeled - 4 x | BTR-40 | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 55 | | 4 | | | | | | | | | |
| ARTILLERY, SELF PROPELLED | | | | | | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,280 | 1,200 | |
| | U/I | 203mm SP | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | + |
| | ARTY | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | PLZ-05 | 155mm SP | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | - | ~80 | ~80 | |
| 05 | | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| | PLZ-45 | 155mm SP | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | + | 80 | 80 | |
| | | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | | 122mm SP | -- | -- | -- | + | 500 | 500 | ~500 | ~500 | |
| 89 | | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | | 152mm SP | + | + | + | 83 | 500 | 500 | 500 | 500 | |
| 83 | | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| | U/I | 130mm SP gun | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | + |
| | ARTY | | | | | | | | | | |
| | WZ- | 122mm SP | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ? | ? | ? | ? |
| | 551 | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | | 122mm SP | D-30 | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 85 | | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | | 122mm SP | -- | -- | ? | + | 200 | 200 | ~200 | ~200 | |
| 70 | | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | YW- | 122mm SP | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 54 | 531 | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| | YW- | 120mm SP mortar | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ? | ? | ? | ? |
| | 381 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | WZ- | 120mm SP mortar | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ? | ? | ? | ? |
| | 551 | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Type | 120mm antitank | -- | -- | ? | + | + | + | + | + | |
| 89 | gun, SP | | | | | | | | | |
| | <u>WZ-</u> | 105mm SP | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | ? | ? | |
| | <u>551</u> | howitzer | | | | | | | | |
| ARTILLERY, TOWED | | | 14,500 | 14,500 | 15,000 | 14,500 | 14,000 | 13,500 | 14,000 | 12,000 |
| Type | <u>WAC-</u> | 155mm howitzer | ~ 30 | 100 | 200 | ~300 | 150 | 150 | + | + |
| 88 | <u>021</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | | 152mm gun | + | + | + | + | + | + | 500 | + |
| <u>83</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | | 152mm gun | <u>D-20</u> | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 1,400 | + | + |
| <u>66</u> | | howitzer | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 152mm howitzer | D-1 M- | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 54 | | 1943 | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | | 130mm field gun | <u>M-46</u> | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| <u>59-1</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 122mm gun | | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 83 | howitzer | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | | 122mm gun | <u>D-74</u> | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>60</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | | 122mm howitzer | <u>D-30 M-</u> | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 |
| <u>54</u> | | 1938 | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | | 100mm antitank | | + | + | + | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| <u>86</u> | | gun, towed | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 100mm antitank | | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 73 | gun, towed | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 100mm antitank | M-1944 | + | + | + | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
| 59 | gun, towed | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 85mm antitank gun | D-44 | | | | | | | | |
| 55 | | | | | | | | | | |
| ARTILLERY ROCKETS | | | 4,500 | 3,800 | 3,500 | 2,500 | 2,400 | 2,200 | 2,000 | 1,800 |
| Type | 425mm rocket, | | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | |
| 762 | mine clearance | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>M-1B</u> | 350mm rocket, 2- | | -- | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | |
| | tube, SP | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | <u>WS-1</u> | 320mm rocket, 4- | -- | + | + | + | + | + | + | |
| 96 | tube, SP | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | <u>74</u> | 284mm rocket, | | + | + | + | + | + | + | |
| | minelayer | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>WM-80</u> | 273mm rocket, 8- | | -- | -- | -- | ? | + | + | + | |
| | tube, SP | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 273mm rocket, 4- | | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | |
| 83 | tube, SP | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <u>Type</u> <u>85</u> | 130mm rocket, 30-tube, APC | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| BM-14-16 | 140mm rocket | | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>82</u> | 130mm rocket, 30-tube, truck | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>70</u> | 130mm rocket, 19-tube, APC | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>63</u> | 130mm rocket, 19-tube, truck | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>90</u> | 122mm rocket, 40-tube, truck | -- | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>89</u> | 122mm rocket, 40-tube, APC | -- | -- | ? | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>83</u> | 122mm rocket, 24-tube, truck | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>81</u> | 122mm rocket, 40-tube, truck | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>81</u> | 107mm rocket, 12-tube | ? | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>63</u> | 107mm rocket, 12-tube | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY | | | 15,000 | 15,000 | 10,000 | ? | 7,700 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| | | | | | | 10,000 | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> <u>59</u> | 1 - 100mm radar, towed | <u>KS-19</u> | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | -- |
| Type 56 | 1 - 85mm radar, towed | KS-18 | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | -- |
| <u>Type</u> <u>80</u> | 2 - 57mm radar/optic, towed | <u>ZSU-57-2</u> | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>Type</u> <u>59</u> | 1 - 57mm radar/optic, towed | <u>S-60</u> | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | -- |
| <u>Type</u> <u>88</u> | 2 - 37mm optic, tracked | | -- | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | + |
| <u>Type</u> <u>74</u> | 2 - 37mm optic, towed | | + | + | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>Type</u> <u>65</u> | 2 - 37mm optic, towed/tracked | | + | + | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>Type</u> <u>63</u> | 2 - 37mm optic, towed | | + | + | + | + | + | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>Type</u> <u>55</u> | 1 - 37mm optic, towed | <u>M-1939</u> | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | -- |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------------|----|----|------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>Type</u> | 2 - 35mm optic, | -- | -- | -- | + | ~50 | ~50 | ~50 | ~50 |
| <u>90</u> | tracked | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | 2 - 25mm optic, | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>87</u> | tracked | | | | | | | | |
| Type | ? - 25mm | -- | -- | -- | + | + | + | + | + |
| 85 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | ? - 23mm | ? | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 80 | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | 4 - 14.5mm optic, | <u>ZPU-2</u> | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>58</u> | towed | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Type</u> | 2 - 14.5mm optic, | <u>ZPU-4</u> | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| <u>56</u> | towed | | | | | | | | |
| SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES | | | | | | | | | |
| <u>DF-11</u> | <u>M-11</u> | CSS-7 | + | + | 200 | 200 | + | + | + |
| <u>DF-15</u> | <u>M-9</u> | CSS-6 | + | + | + | 100 | + | + | + |
| <u>HY-2</u> | | CSS-N-2 | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>HY-4</u> | | | -- | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| ANTI-TANK GUNS | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 120mm, SP | | | | ~300 | ~300 | + | + | + |
| 89 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 100mm | | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 86 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 100mm | | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| 73 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 76mm | | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 54 | | | | | | | | | |
| Type | 57mm | | + | + | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 55 | | | | | | | | | |
| ANTI-TANK, GUIDED | | | | | | | | | |
| HJ-73 | | <u>AT-3</u> | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| <u>HJ-9</u> | | | -- | -- | -- | 24 | + | 24 | 24 |
| <u>HJ-8</u> | TOW | | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |

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